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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Wright defendants, in their Statement of Facts at
page 6, contend that the Sawmill Canyon road has been used historically only for domestic livestock purposes.
otherwise.

The facts are

The road has been used for a variety of purposes,

certainly including grazing domestic livestock, but also including recreational hunting, hunting by persons holding permits,
construction and maintenance.

(Finding of Fact No. 10.)

The

road has carried a variety of vehicles, including recreational
vehicles.

(Id.) The Wrights1 own brief at pp. 8-10 demonstrates

use of the property for hunting by permitted hunters and others
prior to the abandonment of the road by Summit County.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY RESPONDENTS DO NOT
SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENT.
Respondents persist in misinterpreting the two cases

they cite in support of their position, and particularly the
Hague decision.

Respondents rely on that decision to support

their contention that the use of the road cannot be expanded
beyond its lawful use at the time of abandonment.
nor

any

other

decision

cited

position.
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by

respondents

Neither Hague
supports

that

Respondents' entire argument rests on the language from
Hague, which they cite at p. 14 of their brief, as follows:
Respondent's legal right to a reasonably
convenient passageway from his premises to
the street certainly cannot be questioned nor
interfered
with
by
appellant.
Nor
can
respondent prevent appellant from using the
channel for the purposes for which it was
constructed and used prior to the commencement of the action. The extent of the appellant's rights, however, in fluming and maintaining said channel are not unlimited.
If
the banks or sides of the channel were maintained in the street at a certain width and
height during all of the years the channel
had been used by the appellant, it may not,
for its own convenience, change the channel,
if such change interferes with the rights of
others.
Hague v. Juab County Mill & Elevator Company,

107 P. 249, 251

(Utah 1910).
It is critical to an understanding of the quoted language that the reader know which party is "appellant" and which
party is "respondent".

The appellant in Hague was the landowner

(actually the owner of a water channel) over whom the easement
crossed.
defendants

The appellant in Hague, then, corresponds to the Wright
in the

instant case.

The respondent, on the other

hand, was the person seeking the easement, which corresponds to
Shirley Gillmor in the instant case.

With that understanding, it

is clear to see that the restrictions set down in Hague apply to
the Wrights, not to Shirley Gillmor.

-2-

Hague said that the Wrights

can continue to use their property for the purposes for which the
Wrights used their property prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, and that Shirley Gillmor cannot interfere with the Wrights1
use of their property.

However, the court went on to say that

the Wrights' use of their property is not unlimited and that they
may not change the use of their property for their own convenience if to do so would interfere with Shirley Gillmor's right
to cross the property.

The Hague decision says nothing

about

what Shirley Gillmor can and cannot do with the road, let alone
with her own property.

It does not say that the Wrights cannot

alter the use of their own property over time.

It says only that

the Wrights, by changing the use of their property, cannot interfere with Shirley Gillmor's

easement

across the property.

In

other words, if the Wrights want to build an amusement park at
the mouth of Sawmill Canyon, they are free to do so, so long as
Shirley Gillmor can cross with vehicles or livestock.
It should also be noted that neither Hague, nor Mason,
nor any other case cited by any of the parties holds that use of
the road

is restricted to "lawful use," which respondents have

interpreted to mean lawful use of the property.

That is a quali-

fication injected by respondents with absolutely no basis in law
and

one

which

resulted

in

a

time-consuming

-3-

and

unnecessary

sojourn

in this case through the zoning

regulations

of

Summit

County.
Even
degrees

and

if

the

the

holding

restrictions

in Hague
imposed

is

there

turned
on

the

around

180

underlying

landowner are imposed instead on the person seeking the easement,
it still does not support

respondents' position

in this case.

Shirley Gillmor would still be allowed to alter her use of the
road over time, so long as her doing so did not interfere with
the Wrights' use of their property.

The trial court expressly

found, at Findings of Fact No. 18 and 19, that the use of the
road for hunters created no additional burden on the road or on
adjoining property.
Appellant submits that Judge Wilkinson, in ruling from
the bench on plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, misunderstood the Hague decision which, at first glance, without an
understanding

of

which

party

is which,

can

be

misunderstood.

Judge Murphy, in contrast, was alerted in oral argument following
the trial to the confusion created by the quoted language.

In

his written opinion, issued some time after the trial, he indicated that he disagreed with Judge Wilkinson's interpretation and
application of Hague, which Judge Murphy said was inapposite to
the instant case.
expressed

his

(Summary Decision at p. 4.)

opinion

that

the purposes
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Judge Murphy also

for which

access

are

sought do not determine whether access is to be allowed, and that
"a destination purpose does not taint one's use of an easement or
right-of-way as long as that use is not a different or greater
burden on the servient estate."

(Id. at p. 7.)

His own inter-

pretation notwithstanding, however, Judge Murphy felt constrained
by the law of the case doctrine to abide by Judge Wilkinson's
earlier ruling.

(Id. at p. 8.)

Shirley Gillmor should be allowed to cross the Wrights'
property

on the Sawmill Canyon

regardless of her reason

road, as she has

for doing so.

There

always done,

is no Utah

law

which holds otherwise.
II.

IN NO EVENT SHOULD THE NATURE OF THE EASEMENT
BE DETERMINED BY THE USE OF THE PROPERTY.
There

are

sound

reasons

why

the

Utah

would not establish a rule limiting an easement

Supreme

Court

to access for

historical use of the property only.

To do so would mean that

the

easement

use

of

property

reached

by

an

could

never

be

changed, regardless of the amount of time which passed, or how
inefficient
be.

and wasteful such an unnecessary

restriction might

The effect would be that the use of the road, fixed in time,

would thereafter control the use of the property.
In addition, such a de facto restriction on the use of
the property would be inconsistent with the system which has been
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established for regulation of the use of real property.

In the

instant case, the use of the Sawmill property is controlled by
Summit County.

Summit County enacts zoning regulations.

Summit

County determines when a use is permitted or prohibited by its
zoning rules.

Summit County determines when exceptions to zoning

requirements will be allowed, and under what conditions.
Shirley Gillmor should be allowed to travel over the
road in vehicles because, as the trial court found, her doing so
does not impose an additional burden on the road and does not
infringe, in any way, upon the Wrights' use of their property.
What she does when she reaches her property can, and should be,
controlled by Summit County.

If Summit County has since decided

that Mrs. Gillmor1 s use of the property for hunting is allowed
under applicable zoning laws, then it would make no sense to make
such use of the property impossible now because, at the time Summit County abandoned the Sawmill Canyon road, Stephen Gillmor had
not yet obtained a conditional use permit and, therefore, can
never use the road for hunters.
To restrict the use of the road to its use at the time
of abandonment, to characterize the use of the road by the use of
the property at the end of the road, and to prevent thereby any
change of the use of the property, is not required by Utah law

-6-

and would be a bad policy with respect to the development and use
of real property in this state.
CONCLUSION
The judgment

of the lower court should be reversed

insofar as it denies Shirley Gillmor an easement to transport
permitted hunters.

Plaintiff should be awarded a private ease-

ment of access for all purposes, together with a judgment for
damages and an injunction prohibiting any further interference by
the Wright defendants.
DATED this "R^ day of

fdLc^&~*U

, 1991.
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